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“What Does It Mean To Be 
Human?”: Racing Monsters, 
Clones and Replicants
Robyn Morris
How can it not know what it is? (Rick Deckard, Blade Runner)
W hen I looked upon him, when I saw the filthy mass that moved and
talked, my heart sickened, and my feelings were altered to those o f horror
and hatred. (Victor Frankenstein, Frankenstein)
In her first novel When Fox is a Thousand (1995), Calgary-based author 
Larissa Lai incorporated into her narrative selected scenes from the movie 
Blade Runner (Director’s Cut 1992) to interrogate a contemporary filmic 
definition o f humanness that is premised on racialised, sexualised and 
gendered hierarchies. Lai’s intertextual engagement with Blade Runner 
articulates an awareness o f the power o f the Hollywood viewing apparatus to 
colour the look (white) and perpetuate dichotomies o f racial difference. In 
the opening pages of Fox, however, the protagonist Artemis Wong watches 
and contemplates pivotal scenes from the movie in a way that suggests the 
novel’s vision(w)ary renegotiation of power relations based on domination 
and subordination.1 The dialectic between Fox and Blade Runner is continued 
in Lai’s second novel Salt Fish Girl (2002), which will be the primary focus of 
this paper. Characterised by intertextual layering, Salt Fish Girl interrogates 
the construction o f identity through allusion to an older iconic sf western 
text, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. Lai’s fiction functions as a contestation and 
complication o f the literary and filmic perpetuation o f an ideology o f a pure, 
originary and unmarked “humanness”, a definition which has historically 
accorded the white, western, heterosexual male a universal and centred 
subject positioning.
Discerning, defining and designating difference as otherness is paramount 
to the way in which whiteness constructs and reconstructs itself as not raced, 
as not queer, as not coloured, and always as not other, within mainstream texts 
o f science fiction such as Blade Runner and Frankenstein. It is important then, 
to ask, why Lai, who defines herself as a “person of colour”, a feminist and a 
lesbian, should draw on canonical texts o f white and Eurocentric science 
fiction such as Blade Runner and Frankenstein.2 While one text emerges from 
early nineteenth-century imperial England and the other from the late 
twentieth-century imperial filmic apparatus that is Hollywood, both have 
spawned an entire industry o f reviews and responses.3 Extensively written
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about, both texts, like Salt Fish Girl, also allude to various canonical works 
within their own narratives. It might be argued that such literary mirroring 
works towards ensuring the longevity o f the original but this is not entirely 
what Lai’s fiction is about. Incorporating canonical texts into her writing 
allows Lai to interrogate the fixity o f a discourse based on divisive 
boundaries.
Her evocation o f canonical texts is interesting then because of their 
location within the genre o f mainstream science fiction and more particularly 
so since, in the plethora o f critical commentary which has been produced on 
both Frankenstein and Blade Runner, very few critics have read either in the 
context o f race, racism or racialisation.4 Lai refers to Frankenstein in Salt Fish 
Girl and Bldde Runner in When Fox is a Thousand precisely because they are a 
coded articulation, through their depiction o f an “other” who created in the 
image o f humans, o f eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scientific racism. 
The interrogation of this historical “racing” o f human difference in not only 
scientific thought but also in sf literature and film is an essential aspect of 
Lai’s politics o f identity. The strategic inclusion, and reference, to canonical 
texts within Fox and Salt Fish Girl allows for a reading of Lai’s fiction as both 
a charting and critique o f a racialised Enlightenment rhetoric that continues, 
in the post-modern age, to bind discussion o f human variation to skin colour 
and “race”.
Both Fox and Salt Fish Girl are important texts in the emergent area of 
contemporary Asian Canadian writing because o f their contestation of the 
visual designation o f otherness by and at the level o f skin. Lai, who is of 
Chinese ancestry, has commented that, “mainstream Canadian culture 
places people who look like me, on the outside”.5 Emphasising that her 
politics o f identity also embraces the notion of looking back, Lai adds that, 
“there’s a lot o f stuff you can see from there.” The intrinsic link between Lai’s 
fiction and Blade Runner and Frankenstein is a sustained interrogation of a 
colonialist discourse that perpetuates a fear of the visually raced other. While 
identity is positioned in Frankenstein and Blade Runner as culturally 
hierarchical and biologically fixed under the gaze of a white policing 
apparatus Lai’s novels work to reposition identity as a site of individual and 
social transformation.
At the textual level, Salt Fish Girl functions as both an interrogation and 
a redefinition o f conceptual paradigms that contain difference to otherness 
and equate humanness with a singularised white, western, heterosexual male 
selfhood. While there is, as Richard Dyer observes, “no more powerful 
position than that of being ‘just’ human”,6 Lai’s complication o f the term 
“human”, through the introduction of female clones labelled “the Sonia 
series” in Salt Fish Girl, is a strategic intervention in contemporary identity 
politics. Designed as a vast source of expendable factory labour by their 
genetic scientist father Dr Rudy Flowers, the Sonias are coded as “other” not
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simply by their multitudinous similarity, their motherless birth, their slave 
status, or even their human/fish genes, but by their dark hair and eyes. 
Cloned predominantly from the D N A  o f Third World and Indigenous 
peoples o f the past, the Sonias of the future wear, on their skin, the same 
physiognomy o f difference that raced their forebears. As part of a quiet 
rebellion, the Sonias surreptitiously imprint, upon the soles of the shoes they 
produce for the Pallas Shoe Corporation, a haunting question that links Blade 
Runner and Frankenstein to Fox and Salt Fish Girl. In a rhetoric which is both 
poignant and political, the Sonias ask, “what does it mean to be human?” a 
question which Lai uses to trace and expose past and contemporary anxieties 
about difference.
One of the defining characteristics of the sf genre is this very preoccup­
ation with both constructing and deconstructing difference. The reappear­
ance of iconic sf figures such as Frankenstein’s creature or Blade Runner’s 
Replicants in Lai’s fiction, draws attention to stereotypical representations of 
difference while also emphasising the “artificiality, simulation and the 
constructed ‘otherness’ of identity”.7 Frankenstein’s creature, popularly 
referred to as a monster, is depicted in Hollywood movies as grotesque and 
deformed and is defined by his creator as a “filthy daemon”, a “fiend” and a 
“dreaded spectre”.8 Positioned as different and “other” to humanness by and 
through the visual, it is, significantly, the very “horror o f [his] countenance”,9 
his “unearthly ugliness [which] rendered it almost too horrible for human 
eyes”,10 which makes him an object to be feared by his white creator. 
Frankenstein’s creature internalises this imposition o f otherness and cloaks 
what he feels is a hideousness o f form, in seclusion and darkness. But his 
knowledge is such that he understands that the othering process is 
humankind’s “fatal prejudice” , a prejudice which, the creature notes with 
unintended irony, “clouds their eyes”.11 Neither this knowledge, nor the 
creature's lapse into violence is enough to overturn a deeply entrenched 
‘fatal prejudice’ that is premised on a fear o f the inhum an other. 
Frankenstein’s creature is not you, but much like the cloned Sonias and the 
Replicants o f Blade Runner, he could be read as being uncannily like you.
Frankenstein’s creature is, however, also Mary Shelley’s creature. 
Conceived during a nightmare, he is what Helene Cixous, in her analysis of 
Freud’s reading o f Hoffman’s “The Sandman” defines as
the offspring cast off by the self through critical solicitation.-. the ghostly 
figure of non-fulfilment and repression, and not the double as counterpart 
or reflection but rather the doll [read monster] that is neither dead nor 
alive. Expelled, but why?17 
In her 1831 Introduction Shelley bids her “hideous progeny [to] go forth and 
prosper” while Victor Frankenstein laments that he “had turned loose in the 
world a depraved w retch... a being whom I had cast among mankind, and 
endowed with the will and power to effect purposes o f horror... my own spirit
let loose from the grave”.13 This notion o f being cast out, o f  being m ade and 
unmade by a less than benevolent Maker is important to an understanding o f 
the politics o f identity being critiqued by Lai in Salt Fish Girl. Though 
referring to the figure o f the cyborg, Donna Haraway’s observation that, 
“illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their 
fathers, after all, are inessential”14 is useful to this reading o f Lai’s literary 
interrogation o f Euro/phallocentric and capitalist-based constructions o f 
otherness. Victor Frankenstein is “father” to an unnamed creature, Dr Rudy 
Flowers is “father” to the Sonia series and the biomechanic Eldon Tyrell is 
“father” to the Replicants in Blade Runner. A ll fear the return o f their 
creations, seeking to cocoon and isolate themselves against this offspring’s 
wrath o f abandonment. It is hardly coincidental to Lai’s politics that the 
offspring all return, albeit confrontationally, to meet their paternal maker (s) 
and contest the production and marking o f their body as unnaturally ‘other’ 
and their casting out by the society in which they seek to live.
Signaling that Salt Fish Girl intends to interrogate white paternalistic 
stories o f creation and origins, Lai not only commences her narrative with 
those three hauntingly familiar opening words from Genesis, “In the 
beginning” (p .l) but relocates the biblical creation scene to that o f the 
muddy banks o f the Yellow River. It is here, in ancient China, that the half 
woman, half snake goddess, N u Wa creates the first humans from yellow river 
mud. This is not a loving and benevolent creation. The birthing scene is one 
of carnage for N u Wa is unhappy with the way her creatures talk back to, and 
ridicule, their maker. In anger, she tears her creations apart before falling 
asleep amongst what she describes as, and in an uncanny echo o f Victor 
Frankenstein, “the wreckage o f my monstrous creations” (p.3). Nu Wa, 
however, becomes lonely and desires to be like her creations. Forgoing her 
magnificent tail in exchange for human legs Nu Wa undergoes a very painful 
act of rebirth. Her story is linked to that o f the Sonias in future when she 
chooses, as the vessel o f her rebirth, the human form of the narrator 
Miranda. Miranda’s mother became pregnant with Nu Wa at the age o f sixty- 
three after eating the forbidden fruit o f the future, the genetically modified 
durian in which Nu Wa (in a minaturised snake form) was hiding.
Glimpses o f Nu Wa’s long life are filtered through the experience of 
Miranda’s life in the present o f 2062. The past presents itself to Miranda in 
the form of dreams although she largely ignores these historical vignettes. 
While the future world o f Salt Fish Girl is characterised by a denial o f the 
past, remnants and vestiges o f human atrocities continually seep into the 
collective unconscious o f its inhabitants. In a world where it is difficult to 
distinguish between the real and the not real15 it is important that Miranda 
should receive a warning from her mother about the need to “keep old 
games, old stories and traditional values alive” (p.65). Essentialist 
conceptions o f “the real” in the future are continually being challenged
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through the language, stories and culture of the past; a  notion which is 
underscored by Lai when Miranda begins stealing antique wind-up toys 
because of their “lifelikeness” (p.219). Lai exposes the technological as a 
paternal and profit-driven process; a process that, in this future city called 
Serendipity commodifies identity and complicates our p ast conceptions o f 
humanness as realness.
Essential to Lai’s examination of the textual production of power-based 
inequalities is a critique of the way in which fixed binaries such as that o f 
creator/created, human/not human, real/not real, works to assure whiteness 
of its dominance while subjugating and denying the “other’s” movement 
towards an autonomous identity. What constantly arises in  Lai’s work is, as 
she terms it, “the spectre of the hybrid, and the notion o f difference as not 
outside of power, but pressuring it along its borders, from within”-16 Although 
the Sonias, Replicants and Frankenstein’s creature are defined Ly t^eir 
dominant culture as less than human, Lai claims for these cultural hybrids a 
site of identity that is fluid and mobile. Writing' against the border 
protectionist policy which characterises white fear of the mobile “other” , 
Lai’s fiction not only engages with the postcolonial, bi-polarist assumption 
that “the paranoid threat from the hybrid is finally uncontrollable because it 
breaks down the symmetry and duality of self/other, inside outside,”17 but 
moves beyond its ideological confines. Contesting an acculturated split that 
invariably privileges the West over the East, same over other, Lai’s fiction 
consistently works not to suture the unnatural nature o f this split- Instead, 
her novels emphasise the trope of splitting and doubling in order to critique 
its divisive underpinnings. It is then, with more than a little authorial irony, 
that Lai titles the opening chapter of Salt Fish Girl as “The Bifurcation”.
In Colonial Desire, Robert Young locates Western anxieties regarding 
hybridity as a feared “bifurcation”, a racial and cultural splitting that lessens 
the altogether pervasiveness and absolute power of whiteness. Young notes 
the term’s historical attachment to scientific and race-based colonialist 
discourse observing that this discourse circulates around anxiety over 
“decivilisation” resulting from racial mixing, “whereby a culture in its colonial 
operation becomes hybridized, alienated and potentially threatening to its 
European original through the production of polymorphously perverse 
people”.18 This “polymorphic perversity” is what Bhabha has, in an oft 
quoted phrase, defined as “the ambivalent world of the not quite/not 
white”.19 A  definition such as this however continues to reify the centredness 
and normalcy of whiteness by implying that colour is other, less than and 
abnormal (to white). Lai’s conceptualisation of hybridity as pressuring the 
borders from within is liberatory in that it rejects any premise o f a split in 
which a polymorphic difference is read as less than and other to white. While 
in Fox Lai depicts an Asian Canadian woman watching a mainstream film 
such as Blade Runner in order to emphasise the cultural embeddedness o f the
split between East and West, human and non-human, whiteness and other, 
she takes this examination further in Salt Fish Girl. It is through the 
introduction o f the cloned Sonias and their haunting question, “what does it 
mean to be human?” which allows for a reconceptualisation of the term 
hybridity as existing within, not outside the mythological white centre that a 
film such as Blade Runner and a text such as Frankenstein inscribes. In Salt Fish 
Girl Lai constructs a futuristic site of identity that rejects fixed boundaries, a 
site that is instead characterised by an ongoing process o f negotiation and 
transformation. As Trinh Minh-ha writes, “violations o f boundaries have 
always led to displacement, for the in-between zones are the shifting grounds 
on which the (doubly) exiled walk. Not you/like you.”20
Fallen Angels
The link between genetically engineered female factory workers, Replicants 
as beautiful works of art, and a gigantic, poorly stitched together creature 
could appear tenuous if it were not for the fact that all exhibit those 
“invisible” qualities of whiteness which, in the words o f the Replicant’s 
maker, Eldon Tyrell, make them “more human than human”. In his 
examination o f whiteness as an ideology o f power and self-generating social 
privilege, Richard Dyer notes that it is “the soul and the mind [which] form 
part of what makes white people socially white.”21 The inherent power o f 
whiteness resides in a paradox, despite its representation o f itself as 
monolithic, that is, regardless o f a problematic colour mix o f brown eyes, blue 
eyes, green eyes, red, brown and blond hair and all the variations that these 
combinations offer, its discursive power rests on the construction and 
reproduction o f itself as visibly invisible.22 This very invisibility means that in 
social discourse whiteness is taken for what Dyer describes as sameness or 
“the human ordinary”23 and neither the Sonias, the Replicants nor 
Frankenstein’s creature are “human ordinary”.
The identity paradox' o f the Sonias, Frankenstein’s creature and the 
Replicants is such that though they are created by humans, their near white, 
but not ordinary white, visage indicates a transgression of strict social 
boundaries designed to maintain hierarchical divisions. However, while the 
skin of the human hybrid bears the coloured mark o f difference, the figure of 
human-like doubles such as the Sonias is feared because o f its 
unrecognisability; they have been made in the image of whiteness. As Freud 
observes, this mirroring provokes a favourable condition for awakening 
uncanny feelings especially “when there is intellectual uncertainty whether 
an object is alive or not, and when an inanimate object [coloured, inhuman 
and other] becomes too much like an'animate one [whiteness] .”24 To protect 
itself at the centre and to allay its fear o f the “other”, whiteness constructs 
labels of difference. The Replicants in Blade Runner are defined in the film’s 
Prologue as “virtually identical to a human” and the perceived threat o f their
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otherness is controlled through their slave status and their four-year lifespan. 
The Sonias of Salt Fish Girl are also positioned as servile to humanness and 
are controlled through a disc called a “Guardian Angel” that is wired into 
their backs at “birth”. Unlike the Sonias or the Replicants, Frankenstein’s 
creature has none o f these technologically assisted controlling devices. 
Nevertheless, he is positioned as “different” by being delineated early in 
Shelley’s novel as “not quite” human. After surveying the creature fleeing 
upon the arctic ice, Captain Walton describes him as “a being which has the 
shape of a m an... of gigantic stature... a savage inhabitant o f some undiscov­
ered island”.25 In contrast, Victor Frankenstein, who boards Walton’s 
stranded ship just after this sighting, is described as “a human being...a 
European”.28 Later in the narrative the creature’s skin is described as 
mummy-like, his hair as dark and his eyes as yellow and watery. According to 
Anne Mellor, one of the few critics who addresses the issue o f race within 
Shelley’s text, the creature is “other” , precisely because he is “not white 
skinned, not blond haired, not blue eyed. He is not Caucasian. He is not of 
the same race as his maker.”27
If “being” is equated with belonging and whiteness, then Frankenstein’s 
creature, Blade Runner’s Replicants and Flower’s Sonias, are outsiders or non­
beings, their difference designated at the level o f skin. Lai’s examination of 
the notion of “being” and “beginnings” shifts the focus o f human origins from 
the West to the East. It is interesting, especially in light of Lai’s interrogation 
of a colourised and racialised imposition o f otherness, that both the 
Replicant Roy Batty and Frankenstein’s creature locate their sense of 
otherness in the discourse of Western Christianity by defining themselves as 
“fallen angels”. These texts circulate around notions o f whiteness rising, of 
being reborn. But, and as both Nu Wa’s act of creation and the cloning 
process in Salt Fish Girl suggests, this is both a flawed and false rebirth. When 
Roy Batty meets with Chew, his eye-maker, he (mis)quotes William Blake’s 
“America: A  Prophesy” stating “Fiery the angels fell/Deep thunder roll’d 
around the shores/Burning with the fires o f Ore”. In Blake’s original the 
angels do, o f course, rise.
In an act o f literary interweaving, Blake writes back to and illustrates 
scenes from Milton’s Paradise Lost, which is also a key text on which 
Frankenstein’s creature models his own vision o f humanness. With Paradise 
Lost as his guiding text on the principles of humanity, the creature defines 
himself, while exiled in the perpetual whiteness o f the Arctic aboard a ship 
momentarily stranded en route from the port o f Archangel, as the dark, 
devilish and fallen other. C ast out by the whiteness which Victor 
Frankenstein personifies, the creature tells Captain Walton over the corpse 
of his Maker that he is a “fallen angel”.28 It is the second time he defines 
himself as such, the first, just before he begins the story o f his life after his 
(mis) creation to his maker Frankenstein. In this instance the creature states,
“I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather a fallen angel, 
whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed.”29
The creature is symbolically shrouded, at the close o f the novel, by the 
arctic, a bastion until recently and like space and the deep sea, o f (white) 
male exploration and control. This is suggestive, perhaps, o f both the racialist 
and gendered underpinnings of the novel but also of the paradox of 
whiteness; for its reproductive power, both figuratively and metaphorically, 
lies in what is inaccessible and invisible but also in the corporeality and 
technological reproductive capacities o f the white male. The creature’s self- 
definition as a fallen angel, so closely linked to the story of biblical beginnings 
and appearing in a text proclaimed by Mary Shelley to incite terror and 
horror through the monstrous inhuman other,30 is significant to Lai’s 
appropriation o f the original in her own hybridised-postmodem-science 
fiction-horror story. Ironically, it is not so much the revolting origins o f the 
charnel house from which the creature emerges but the physical and 
psychological feeling of revolt that Victor Frankenstein experiences upon 
viewing his creation that determines the creature’s casting out from the 
centre o f civilised society. The revulsion he feels upon the birth o f his 
creature relates to a (mis)reproduction. It is not so much who, but what, is 
the object and underlying cause o f this evocation of revulsion, terror and 
horror that Lai’s text seeks to address. In policing a border of homogeneity 
and perpetuating the fallacy o f white maleness as normalcy, whiteness 
maintains its self-assumed position at the centre. So, fallen angels meet and 
(re) meet their makers and monsters and Replicants are cast as the dark and 
devilish other. And yet, it is through their acculturated otherness that Lai 
questions the very constructedness o f origins, o f the unnatural split between 
darkness falling and whiteness ascending.
Onto this already heavily laden palimpsest of iconic texts, Lai projects the 
figures o f the cloned Sonia series, and their renegade leader, Evie. And what 
links does she have, if  any, to that infamously cast-out woman in the 
Christian myth o f origins, Eve? Evie is not Milton’s daughter; she has neither 
a devoted, dutiful nor a docile attitude towards her father. In an ironic twist 
in Salt Fish Girl, Nu Wa, in her futuristic form as Miranda, makes a return of 
sorts, with Evie, to Evie’s “father”, Dr Rudy Flowers. It is during a heated 
confrontation in which Flowers attempts to justify his role in destroying the 
renegade Sonias’ safe-haven that Miranda stabs him with the knife Evie was 
carrying. In a reversal o f the Blade Runner and Frankenstein narratives, it is 
the maker (Nu Wa), who initiates the unmaking and unlike Eldon Tyrell or 
Victor Frankenstein, Rudy Flowers does not die. Although N u Wa exper­
iences first-hand the malevolence o f her human creations she maintains her 
non-interventionist approach stating, “I am the maker of your maker. Both of 
us, such putrid origins, climbing out of the mud and muck into darkness. But 
I did not want to unmake what I had made, imperfect and wicked as it was”
(p.253). As creator, Nu Wa assumes responsibility for her offspring. 
Understanding that the creation process is not seamless, that in its very 
randomness both perfection and mutations can occur, N u Wa does not 
initiate acts o f retribution; there are no floods, no pestilence, no four year life 
span, no abandonment and certainly no killing o f the offspring on sacrificial 
crosses in this story o f ‘human’ origins. Evie’s narrative is a determined effort 
by Lai to situate the woman of colour’s story outside of the discourse o f both 
paternal and white Western origins. Evie does not regard herself as a fallen 
angel and Evie, unlike the Replicant Roy Batty or Frankenstein’s creature, 
does not return to her father in search o f a prelapsarian grace and harmony. 
Evie’s narrative is a direct reaction to stories o f paternal-driven deeds and 
origins. It is through Evie and the Sonias’ quest for independence that Lai 
rejects the narrativising o f women, and more particularly, women of Asian 
descent, as passive and silent under white, western, patriarchal scrutiny.
Lai’s novels instead emphasise the multidimensional aspect o f vision and 
this is particularly prevalent in Fox which interrogates the way both race and 
gender are marked by and through scopic regimes o f power. In one scene, the 
central protagonist Artemis Wong is taken by her friend Eden to a collector 
of oriental antique garments to whom she desires to sell an item of clothing. 
The collector, Mr Hawkesworth, is described, “ [as taking] the garment in his 
long bony hands and scrutinising it with an almost pornographic gaze that 
made her shiver” (p. 115). That Artemis should shiver when framed as other 
by the dominant white culture, o f which Mr Hawkesworth is representative, 
is indicative of her status and awareness o f her positioning as both sexual and 
racial prey. The narrative, however, functions to reconceptualise the act of 
looking as an interactive process, one which resists the positioning o f Asian 
female selfhood as passive under scrutiny. It is within her fiction that Lai 
seeks to renegotiate the very structures that seek to frame an Asian 
Canadian woman such as Artemis as silent and passive; existing, much like 
the stereotypes o f M adame Butterfly and Suzie Wong, only as objects of 
western and masculine desire.
Rejecting this framing o f female, Asian Canadian subjectivity as passive 
under white, male scrutiny, is central to Lai’s politics of glancing back and 
through a dominant white culture. It is no coincidence that in Fox, Artemis 
watches and reacts against two scenes that show the Blade Runner Rick 
Deckard (played by Harrison Ford) exerting strength and power against 
women. The first is when he slams the Replicant Rachel up against a wall, 
“snarling”, as Lai describes it, and forcing her to say, “kiss me” (Fox, p. 15). 
The second is when he shoots another Replicant, Zhora, in the back as she 
attempts to flee both his gun and his gaze. The final scene from the film that 
Artemis watches before falling asleep is the shooting of Zhora by Deckard. 
The inclusion o f Zhora’s death in Fox is more than a passing comment on the 
representation o f women as objects o f voyeuristic pleasure. The positioning
of women within the film sets up a hierarchical dualism between male and 
female, but as Deckard’s lead in the “romantic” dialogue between himself 
and the Replicant Rachel suggests, always in need o f patriarchal control. 
While Deckard may ultimately help Rachel to escape Zhora’s fate, she 
remains fixed as an “other” under the gaze o f a pervasive policing 
mechanism. A s we read Artemis watching this filmic sequence in the novel, 
it becomes increasingly apparent that she, like Rachel and like Zhora, has 
also been culturally positioned as one o f the hunted.
In Salt Fish Girl Lai further explores this inscription of a passive and 
gendered otherness through vision but at the same time writes against the 
stereotypes of Madam Butterfly and Suzie Wong that continue to hover in 
the collective consciousness o f the West.31 Salt Fish Girl works as a political 
satire precisely because its narrative deconstructs the myth that there is a 
danger in the “other” looking back; that returning the gaze can result in a 
Medusa-like freezing o f Asian Canadian female subjectivity in the frame of 
white, western, male domination. Helene Cixous has written that to alter 
embedded discourses premised on exclusion by race or gender “you have only 
to' look at Medusa straight on to see her. And she’s not deadly. She’s beautiful 
and she’s laughing.”32 Lai accords the Sonias a measure o f power and 
autonomy through the control of their own reproductive capacities and their 
ability to live independently. Although the Sonias are constantly under 
surveillance through the “Guardian Angel”, they attempt to circumvent or 
escape their subservient gendered and racial subject positioning. This allows 
for a contestation o f the embeddedness o f the hierarchical dualism between 
East and West whereby the East is signified as passive and feminine, exotic 
and other but always in need o f guidance and control. The Sonias reject any 
assumption o f Western domination by ripping the “Guardian Angel” out of 
their backs. It is however, their chance discovery o f the reproductive 
capacities o f the durian seed (which has been genetically modified to help 
infertile women conceive), that allows the Sonias a sense of freedom and a 
chance o f longevity that is denied to them on the factory production lines.
In exploiting the same technological process that exploits them, the 
Sonias are able to nurture new and free baby Sonias. These births offer a 
redemptive space for the Sonias in which to form a female community that 
is unavailable to Frankenstein’s creature or the Replicants o f Blade Runner. It 
is also for this reason which Rudy Flowers helps the brown-shirted, black 
booted, Pallas Police to seek out and destroy the safe-haven o f the renegade 
Sonias. A s he tells Evie, “you don’t know what monstrosities might have 
come of those births” (p.256). Flowers uncannily echoes Victor Frankenstein 
(and there are several o f these “echoes” in Salt Fish Girl), who destroys his 
female creation fearing that she and his male creature would propagate a 
“race o f devils” upon the earth, making “the existence o f the species o f man 
a condition precarious and full of terror”.33 There is a historical fear o f the
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“yellowing” of whiteness and both Frankenstein and Flowers are seeking to 
enact a white future through patriarchal control of human and non-human 
reproductive processes. The generic intertextuality which characterises Lai’s 
fiction acts as a literary interrogation of the continued patriarchal confluence 
of “monstrosity” with female reproduction, a conjoining that also attempts to 
mask white, patriarchal fear o f difference. Indicating the importance o f a 
feminist “politics o f difference”, Salt Fish Girl begins with N u Wa’s creation 
of humans from river mud in ancient China, and concludes with N u Wa, in 
her human form as Miranda, giving birth to a baby girl through the bloody 
and painful act of womb birth. Directly linking reproduction to the maternal 
rather than the technological allows for a contestation o f historically embed­
ded textualisations of human origins as a natural, Western and paternal 
creation.
Paternal creation is premised on the desire to reproduce the “sacred 
image of the same, o f the one true copy, mediated by the luminous 
technologies of compulsory heterosexuality and masculinist self-birthing”.34 
However, when the copy assumes the privileges of “humans”, they are 
perceived as rebellious and in need of (brutal) control. The predetermined 
and stereotypical servility of the Sonias is a constructed bond between 
creator and creation and reflective o f that between colonial master and 
indigenous or imported slave. The birth o f free baby Sonias is a direct 
circumvention of the slave/master relationship but it results in a brutal 
massacre with the slain Sonias hastily buried in shallow graves. Mourning the 
loss o f her sisters the eldest Sonia, Sonia 14, finds the grave and identifies, in 
a poignant inscription o f subjectivity, each o f the Sonias by their individual 
body markings. Despite the sameness o f their origins, the cloned Sonias 
become, as the narrative progresses, more human and more individual than 
those who manufacture or hunt them down.
In the closing pages o f Black Skin, White Masks Fanon argues that:
Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence 
on another man in order to be recognised by him. As long as he has not 
been effectively recognised by the other, that other will remain the theme 
of his actions. It is on that other being, on recognition by that other being, 
that his own human worth and reality depend. It is on that other being in 
whom the meaning of his life is condensed.35 
It follows that if the desire to reproduce copies is a , confirmation o f the 
superiority of humanness then in seeking a reflection or recognition o f itself, 
whiteness, masquerading as humanness, constructs or defines otherness 
through powers of the cognitive. How ironic is it then, that the Replicants 
gaze back at humanness with prosthetic eyes, that Frankenstein’s creature 
gazes on his maker with watery, yellow eyes and that the Sonias’ dark eyes are 
the reproduction of an orientalist fear o f the inscrutable “Asian other” ? If 
there is a reflection o f whiteness within the offspring’s eyes then it is one that
is both blurred and inherently flawed. Denying that it sees this "flawed image 
o f itself in the eyes o f the other, the white maker seeks to destroy the offspring 
and in doing so, perpetuate the myth of human worthiness and ordinariness 
in his own terms. The reappearance of Frankenstein’s creature and Blade 
Runner’s Replicants within Lai’s fiction allows her to navigate across 
established generic and racialised borders while complicating and critiquing 
the cultural embeddedness o f divisive identity structures in which difference 
is designated at the level of skin.
Virtual Humanness
Otherness is designated through the defining eye of whiteness and it remains 
significant that Lai should return to a critique o f the white gaze that she 
began in Fox, at the close o f the Salt Fish Girl narrative. On the run from the 
Pallas Police after the stabbing incident with Rudy Flowers, Miranda and 
Evie hide in an aquarium which Evie, who is a mixture of human and point 
zero three percent freshwater carp, acknowledges is the home “mother” and 
the place, as she notes with understated irony, in which “many lives begin” 
(p.261). A s she gazes at her mother and an assortment of other marine 
creatures, Evie comments that it is “hard not to believe in G o d ...if you look 
at this, and if it makes you believe in God, then you also have to believe that 
it was all meant for human pleasure” (p.262). While Evie is suggesting that 
there is pleasure in looking there is also the implied association of looking 
with power. Lai immediately undermines this when Miranda reads a note on 
the octopus tank that declares, “octopus eyes and human eyes were very 
similar in their construction and functioning” (p.262). If non-human and 
human vision is hauntingly similar then the definition of humanness hinges 
on and circulates around the acquisition and protection o f a race-based 
power. The figure o f Evie, and her human/fish genes, exists in a liminal state, 
neither fully human nor non-human. This ambiguity surrounding her 
identity is one way that Lai complicates conceptions of humanness as whole, 
centred, complete; “the real thing”. Evie and her Sonia sisters serve a critical 
role in Salt Fish Girl, for it is through the figure/s of the clone/s that the 
potential for a sustained literary and theoretical examination of white 
maleness as a constructed humanness is justifiably exposed.
The intertextuality that characterises Lai’s fiction works as a criticism of 
a literary canon that has historically given primacy to, and privileged the 
stories and deeds of the white male. In consciously traversing the line 
between the reality of the past and the dystopian future and interspersing this 
with reference to Frankenstein in Salt Fish Girl and Blade Runner in Fox, Lai 
breaks what Fredric Jameson has defined as the “social contract”36 that exists 
between writer and reader. More importantly, Lai resists women’s, and more 
particularly, women of colour, lesbian and feminist women’s devalued 
position in the historical contract by repudiating any singular conception of
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storytelling. Both Salt Fish Girl and Fox function to displace traditional 
conceptions of history and storytelling while also understanding that the act 
of transmitting is an elliptical process. Walter Benjamin has observed that 
storytelling is “the art o f repeating stories”,37 but Lai’s novels have 
resonances beyond merely the repetition o f ancient (white, male and 
western) words. Stories are as Trinh Minh-ha asserts, always evolving; 
“Pleasure in the copy. Pleasure in the reproduction. N o repetition can ever 
be identical, but my story carries with it their stories, their histories, and our 
story repeats itself endlessly, despite our persistence in denying it.”38 The 
historically continuous narrative voice o f Nu Wa and her observation o f the 
experience of the renegade Sonias in Salt Fish Girl suggests that storytelling 
is a viable means through which versions of history other than that of 
whiteness may be transmitted to the future.
Both When Fox is a Thousand and Salt Fish Girl interrogate the process o f 
racialisation by a dual examination o f not only the way in which humanness 
is constructed as white, male, Western and heterosexual, but also how 
whiteness constructs and continually reconstructs itself as naturally not other 
within mainstream texts such as Blade Runner and Frankenstein. Lai’s fiction 
challenges essentialist conceptual paradigms steeped in a history o f 
domination and control. Her novels draw attention to this historical practice 
while also offering ways for a new generation o f writers o f colour to resist and 
challenge the reproduction of not only racial, sexual and gendered, but also 
generic stereotypes. Salt Fish Girl links phrenologically based racial discourse 
o f the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century and projects their incumbent 
racialised hierarchies onto a future in which D N A  replication reflects the 
same ideological polarisations o f the past. But humanness, as the Sonias’ 
question exposes in Salt Fish Girl, is an arbitrary definition heavily laden with 
historically racist and gendered baggage. Lai questions both the constructed- 
ness and historical fixity o f historically entrenched and culturally scripted 
differences between human and non-human, white and coloured, angel and 
monster, animate and inanimate, same and other. Her own body o f fiction 
functions as an evolving and insightful examination o f acculturated 
boundaries in which identity is determined by a hierarchical physiognomy of 
difference and is controlled by a white fear o f (mis) reproduction.
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